Game of Thrones: Fully Distributed Learning for Multi-Player Bandits by Bistritz, Ilai & Leshem, Amir
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
11
16
2v
3 
 [c
s.G
T]
  7
 Fe
b 2
01
9
1
Game of Thrones: Fully Distributed Learning for
Multi-Player Bandits
Ilai Bistritz and Amir Leshem
Abstract
We consider a multi-armed bandit game where N players compete for M arms for T turns. Each player has different expected
rewards for the arms, and the instantaneous rewards are independent and identically distributed or Markovian. When two or more
players choose the same arm, they all receive zero reward. Performance is measured using the expected sum of regrets, compared
to optimal assignment of arms to players. We assume that each player only knows her actions and the reward she received
each turn. Players cannot observe the actions of other players, and no communication between players is possible. We present a
distributed algorithm and prove that it achieves an expected sum of regrets of near-O (log T ). This is the first algorithm to achieve
a near order optimal regret in this fully distributed scenario. All other works have assumed that either all players have the same
vector of expected rewards or that communication between players is possible.
I. INTRODUCTION
In online learning problems, an agent needs to learn on the run how to behave optimally. The crux of these problems is the
tradeoff between exploration and exploitation. This tradeoff is well captured by the multi-armed bandit problem, which has
attracted enormous attention from the research community [2]–[8]. In the multi-armed bandit problem, on each turn, for a total
of T turns, an agent has to choose to pull one of the arms of several slot machines (bandits). Each arm provides a stochastic
reward with a distribution which is unknown to the agent. The agent’s performance is measured by the expected difference
between the sum of rewards and the sum of rewards she could have achieved if she knew the statistics of the machines. In
their seminal work, [9] proved that the best policy achieves a regret of O (logT ).
Recently, there has been growing interest in the case of the multi-player multi-armed bandit. In the multi-player scenario,
the nature of the interaction between the players can take many forms. Players may want to solve the problem of finding
the best arms as a team [10]–[16], or may compete over the arms as resources they all individually require [17]–[26]. The
idea of regret in the competitive multi-player multi-armed bandit problem is the expected sum of regrets and is defined as the
performance loss compared to the optimal assignment of arms to players. The rationale for this notion of regret is formulated
from the designer’s perspective, who wants the distributed system of individuals to converge to a globally good solution.
Many works have considered a scenario where all the players have the same expectations for the rewards of all arms.
Some of these works assume that communication between players is possible [20]–[22], [24], whereas others consider a fully
distributed scenario [17], [23], [25].
This research was supported by the Israeli Ministry of Science and Technology under grant 3-13038 and by a joint ISF-NRF research grant number 2277/16.
A paper with a preliminary version of this study ( [1]) was accepted to the thirty-second Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2018).
2One of the main reasons for studying resource allocation bandits has to do with their applications in wireless networks. In
these scenarios, the channels are interpreted as the arms and the channel gain (or signal to noise ratio) as the arm’s reward.
However, since users are scattered in space, the physical reality dictates that different arms have different expected channel
gains for different players. Different users having different preferences is of course the typical case in many other resource
allocation scenarios as well.
This essential generalization for a matrix of expected rewards introduces the famous assignment problem [27]. Achieving
a sublinear expected total regret in a distributed manner requires a distributed solution to the assignment problem, which by
itself has been explored extensively, for example in [28], [29].
This generalization was first considered in [18], [19], and later enhanced in [18], where an algorithm that achieves an
expected sum of regrets of near-O (logT ) was presented. However, this algorithm requires communication between players.
It is based on the distributed auction algorithm in [28], which is not fully distributed. It requires that players can observe
the bids of other players. This was possible in [18], [19] since it was assumed that the players could observe the actions of
other players, which allowed them to communicate by using arm choices as a signaling method. In [30], the authors suggested
an algorithm that only assumes users can sense all channels without knowing which channels were chosen by whom. This
algorithm requires less communication than [18], but has no regret guarantees.
In wireless networks, assuming that each user can hear all the other transmissions (fully connected network) is very demanding
in practice. It requires a large sensing overhead or might simply be impossible due to the geometry of the network (e.g., exposed
and hidden terminals). In a fully distributed scenario, players only have access to their previous actions and rewards. However,
to date there is no completely distributed algorithm that converges to the exact optimal solution of the assignment problem.
The fully distributed multi-armed bandit problem remains unresolved.
Our work generalizes [17] for different expectations for different players and [18], [19], [30] for a fully distributed scenario
with no communication between players.
Recently, powerful payoff-based dynamics were introduced by [31], [32]. These dynamics only require each player to know
her own action and the reward she received for that action. The dynamics in [31] guarantee that the Nash equilibrium (NE)
with the best sum of utilities strategy profile will be played a sufficiently large portion of the time. The dynamics in [32]
guarantee that the optimal sum of utilities strategy profile will be played a sufficiently large portion of the time, even if it
is not a NE. In [33], equipping the dynamics of [32] with a decreasing exploration rate sequence was shown to provide a
convergence in probability guarantee to the optimal sum of utilities solution. However, no explicit probability of convergence
in a specific finite time was provided, which is essential for regret computation. Nevertheless, the crucial issue of applying
these results to our case is that they all assume interdependent games. Interdependent games are games where each group
of players can always influence at least one player from outside this group. In the multiplayer multi-armed bandit collision
model, this does not hold. A player who shares an arm with another receives zero reward. Nothing that other players (who
chose other arms) can do will change this.
In this paper, we suggest novel modified dynamics that behave similarly to [32], but in our non-interdependent game. These
dynamics guarantee that the optimal solution to the assignment problem is played a considerable amount of the time. We
3present a fully distributed multi-player multi-armed bandit algorithm for the resource allocation and collision scenario, based
on these modified dynamics. By fully distributed we mean that players only have access to their own actions and rewards. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithm that achieves a near-optimal (O (logT )) expected sum of regrets with
a matrix of expected rewards and no communication at all between players, or equivalently, a game where players cannot
observe the actions of other players.
A. Outline
In Section II, we formalize the multi-player multi-armed bandit resource allocation scenario. In Section III, we describe our
fully distributed Game of Thrones (GoT) algorithm. In the first phase of every epoch, players explore in order to estimate the
expectations of the arm rewards. This phase is analyzed in Section IV. In the second phase of every epoch, players use our
modified dynamics and play the optimal solution most of the time. This is analyzed in Section V. In the third and final phase
of every epoch, players play the action they played most of the time in the recent GoT phases. In Section VI, we generalize
our main result to the case of Markovian rewards. We demonstrate our algorithm’s performance using numerical experiments
in Section VII and conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a stochastic game with the set of players N = {1, ..., N} and a finite time horizon T . The horizon T is not
known in advance by any of the players. The discrete turn index is denoted by t. The strategy space of each player is a set
of M arms denoted by An = {1, ...,M} for each n. We assume that M ≥ N , such that an allocation without collisions is
possible. At each turn t, all players simultaneously pick one arm each. The arm that player n chooses at time t is denoted by
an (t) and the strategy profile at time t is a (t). Players do not know which arms the other players chose, and need not even
know how many other players there are.
Define the set of players that chose arm i in strategy profile a
Ni (a) = {n | an = i} . (1)
Define the no-collision indicator of arm i in strategy profile a
ηi (a) =
{ 0 ∣∣∣Ni (a)∣∣∣ > 1
1 o.w.
. (2)
The assumptions on the stochastic rewards are as follows. We also study the case of Markovian rewards in Section VI.
Definition 1. The sequence of rewards {rn,i (t)}t of arm i for player n is i.i.d. (“in time”) with expectation µn,i and variance
σ2n,i such that:
1) The distribution of rn,i (t) is continuous for each n, i.
2) For some positive parameter bn,i we have E
{
|rn,i (t)− µn,i|k
}
≤ 12k!σ2n,ibk−2n,i for all integers k ≥ 3.
3) The sequences {rn,i (t)}t are independent for different n or different i.
4The family of distributions that satisfies the second condition (known as Bernstein’s condition, see [34]) includes, among many
others, the normal and Laplace distributions and, trivially, any bounded distribution. The instantaneous utility of player n in
strategy profile a (t) in time t is
υn (a (t)) = rn,an(t) (t) ηan(t) (a (t)) . (3)
Our goal is to design a distributed algorithm that minimizes the expected total regret, defined next.
Definition 2. Denote the expected utility of player n in the strategy profile a by gn (a) = E {υn (a)}. The total regret is
defined as the random variable
R =
T∑
t=1
N∑
n=1
υn (a
∗)−
T∑
t=1
N∑
n=1
rn,an(t) (t) ηan(t) (a (t)) (4)
where
a
∗ = argmax
a
N∑
n=1
gn (a) . (5)
The expected total regret R¯ , E {R} is the average of (4) over the randomness of the rewards {rn,i (t)}t, that dictate the
random actions {an (t)}.
The problem in (5) is no other than the famous assignment problem [27] on the N ×M matrix of expectations {µn,i}. In
this sense, our problem is a generalization of the distributed assignment problem to an online learning framework.
Assuming continuously distributed rewards is well justified in wireless networks. Given no collision, the quality of an arm
(channel) always has a continuous measure like SNR or a channel gain. Since the probability that the reward will be zero in a
non-collision is zero, players can deduce their collision indicator with probability 1 and rule out collisions in their estimation
of the expected reward. In Section VI, we extend our results to discrete Markovian rewards, that include i.i.d. discrete rewards
as a special case. This reflects a case where each user can operate in one out of a finite number of qualities of service.
According to the seminal work [9], the optimal regret of the single-player case is logarithmic; i.e., O (logT ). The multiple
players do not help each other; hence, we expect the expected total regret lower bound to be logarithmic at best, as shown by
the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The expected total regret is at least Ω (logT ).
Proof: Assume that for N > 1 there is a policy that results in a total expected regret lower than Ω (logT ). Hence, there
must exist a player for which the personal regret is also lower than Ω (logT ). This player, denoted player n, can simulate
N − 1 other players and generate their expectations and rewards at random, all of which are independent of the actual rewards
she receives. This player also simulates the policies for other players, and even knows when a collision occurred for herself
and can assign zero reward in that case. Hence, simulating N − 1 fictitious players is a valid single player multi-armed bandit
policy that violates the Ω (logT ) bound, which is a contradiction. We conclude that this bound is also valid for N > 1.
5III. GAME OF THRONES ALGORITHM
When all players have the same arm expectations, the exploration phase is used to identify the N best arms. Once the best
arms are identified, players need to coordinate to be sure that each of them will sit on a different “chair” (see the Musical
Chairs algorithm in [17]). When players have different arm expectations, a non-cooperative game is induced where the estimated
expected rewards serve as utilities. In this game, players cannot sit on an ordinary chair without causing a linear regret, and
must strive for a single throne. This throne is the arm they must play in the allocation that maximizes the sum of the expected
rewards of all players. Any other solution will result in linear (in T ) expected total regret. Note that our assignment problem
has a unique optimal allocation with probability 1 (as shown in Lemma 10).
The total time needed for exploration increases with T since the cost of being wrong becomes higher. When T is known
by the players, a long enough exploration can be accomplished at the beginning of the game. In order to maintain the right
balance between exploration and exploitation when T is not known in advance to the players, we divide the T turns into
epochs, one starting immediately after the other. Each epoch is further divided into three phases. In the k-th epoch:
1) Exploration Phase - this phase has a length of c1k
δ turns for some constant c1 and a positive δ. It is used for estimating
the expectation of the arms. It is described in detail and analyzed in Section IV. It adds a O
(
log1+δ T
)
to the expected
total regret.
2) Game of Thrones (GoT) Phase - this phase has a length of c2k
δ turns for some constant c2 and a positive δ. In
this phase, players play a non-cooperative game with the estimated expectations from the exploration phase as their
deterministic utilities. They choose their action at random according to payoff-based dynamics that always assign a
positive probability for exploration. These dynamics induce a perturbed (ergodic) Markov chain that tends to visit the
optimal sum of utilities (in (5)) state more often than other states. When the exploration rate is low enough, the optimal
state has a probability greater than 12 in the stationary distribution of the chain. Hence, all players play the optimal action
most of the time and can agree on the optimal state distributedly. These arguments are detailed and analyzed in Section
V. This phase adds a O
(
log1+δ T
)
to the expected total regret. The GoT dynamics are described in the next subsection.
3) Exploitation Phase - this phase has a length of c32
k turns for some constant c3. During this phase, each player plays
the most frequent action she has played during the last
⌊
k
2
⌋
+1 GoT phases combined. Since the error probability of the
exploration phase is kept small, it is very likely that all the last
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1 exploration phases agree on the same optimal
state. Hence, by playing their most frequent action, players are highly likely to play the optimal strategy profile that has
a stationary distribution of more than 12 in all the last
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1 GoT Markov chains. This phase adds a vanishing term
(with T ) to the expected total regret.
This division into epochs is depicted in Fig. 1. The GoT algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
A. Game of Thrones Dynamics
The core of our algorithm is the GoT dynamics of the second phase, where players play the game of thrones with the
utility function un (a) for player n. Denote the optimal objective by J1 and J0 =
∑
n un,max for un,max = max
a
un (a). Let
6c ≥ J0 − J1. Each player n has a personal state Mn = {C,D} where C is content and D is discontent. Each player keeps a
baseline action an. In each turn during the GoT phase:
• A content player has a very small probability of deviating from her current baseline action
pann =
{ εc∣∣∣An∣∣∣−1 an 6= an
1− εc an = an
(6)
• A discontent player chooses an action uniformly at random; i.e.,
pann =
1∣∣∣An∣∣∣ , ∀an ∈ An (7)
The transitions between C and D are determined as follows:
• If an = an and un > 0, then a content player remains content with probability 1
[an, C]→ [an, C] (8)
• If an 6= an or un = 0 or Mn = D, then the state transition is (C/D denoting either C or D)
[an, C/D]→
{
[an, C]
un
un,max
εun,max−un
[an, D] 1− unun,max εun,max−un
(9)
Algorithm 1 Game of Thrones Algorithm
Initialization -Set k = 1, δ > 0, ε > 0 and Vn,i (0) = 0, sn,i (0) = 0 for each arm i = 1, ..,M .
For t = 1, ..., T
1) Exploration Phase - for the next c1k
δ turns
a) Sample an arm i uniformly at random from all M arms.
b) Receive the reward rn,i (t) and set ηi (t) = 0 if rn,i (t) = 0 and ηi (t) = 1 otherwise.
c) If ηi (t) = 1 then update Vn,i (t) = Vn,i (t− 1) + 1 and sn,i (t) = sn,i (t− 1) + rn,i (t).
d) Estimate the expectation of arm i by µkn,i =
sn,i(t)
Vn,i(t)
, for each i = 1, ...,M .
2) GoT Phase - for the next c2k
δ turns, play according to the GoT Dynamics with ε. Set Mn = C and set an to the last
action played in the k − ⌊k2 ⌋− 1 GoT phase, or a random action if k = 1, 2.
a) If Mn = C then play according to (6) and if Mn = D then choose an arm at random (7).
b) If an 6= an or un = 0 or Mn = D then set Mn = C w.p. unun,max εun,max−un (otherwise Mn = D).
c) Keep track of the number of times each action was played and resulted in being content:
Fnk (i) ,
∑
t∈Gk
I (an (t) = i,Mn (t) = C) (10)
where I is the indicator function and Gk is the set of turns of the k-th GoT phase.
3) Exploitation Phase -
a) In the next c32
k turns, play
akn = arg max
i=1,...,M
⌊ k2 ⌋∑
r=0
Fnk−r (i) (11)
4) Update k ← k + 1.
End
In this paper, we prove the following main result, which is later generalized to Markovian rewards in Section VI. It requires
7Fig. 1. Epoch structure. Depicted are the first and the k-th epochs.
a small enough ε to hold. The proof of Theorem 14 provides an explicit requirement on ε.
Theorem 4 (Main Theorem). Assume i.i.d. rewards {rn,i (t)}t with positive expectations {µn,i}, as in Definition 1. Let the
game have a finite horizon T , unknown to the players. Let each player play according to Algorithm 1, with c1, c2, c3, δ > 0
and a small enough ε. Then, for large enough T , the expected total regret is bounded by
R¯ ≤ 4 (c1 + c2)N log1+δ2
(
T
c3
+ 2
)
= O
(
log1+δ T
)
. (12)
Proof: Let δ > 0. Denote the number of epochs that start within T turns by E. Since
T ≥
E−1∑
k=1
(
c1k
δ + c2k
δ + c32
k
) ≥ c3 (2E − 2) (13)
E is upper bounded by E ≤ log2
(
T
c3
+ 2
)
. Let k0 be the index of a sufficiently large epoch. We now bound the expected
total regret of epoch k > k0, denoted by R¯k. Denote by Ek the event where the k-th exploitation phase does not consist of
playing the optimal assignment a∗. We have
Pr (Ek) ≤ Pr
⌊
k
2 ⌋⋃
r=0
Pe,k−r
+ Pc,k (14)
where Pe,k is the probability that the k-th exploration phase results in an estimation for which the optimal assignment is
different from a∗, and Pc,k is the probability that a∗ was not the most frequent state in the last
⌊
k
2
⌋
+1 GoT phases combined.
Note that if neither of these failures occurred, then a∗ is played in the k-th exploitation phase, which establishes (14). Only
under Ek will this exploitation phase contribute to the total regret. Denote w =
(J1−J2)2
MN2(80σ2max+
40bmax
N
(J1−J2)) . For k > k0 we
obtain, for any 0 < η < 12 , that
R¯k ≤ (c1 + c2) kδN +
Pr
⌊
k
2 ⌋⋃
r=0
Pe,k−r
+ Pc,k
 c32kN ≤
(a)
(c1 + c2) k
δN+
 2NM
1− e−wc1( k4 )δ
e−
w
2 c1(
k
4 )
δ
k +
NM
1− e− 136M2 c1( k4 )
δ e
− 1
72M2
c1( k4 )
δ
k +
(
C0e
− η2
144Tm( 18 )
(piz∗− 12(1−η) )( k2 )
δ
)k c32kN
≤
(b)
2 (c1 + c2) k
δN (15)
where in (a) we used the upper bounds on Pr
(⋃⌊k2 ⌋
r=0 Pe,k−r
)
, Pc,k from Lemma 7 and Lemma 16, respectively. Note that
Lemma 16 holds for a small enough ε, for which piz∗ >
1
2(1−η) . Inequality (b) follows since for k > k0 we have
max
{
e−
w
2 c1(
k
4 )
δ
, e−
1
72M2
c1( k4 )
δ
, C0e
− η2
144Tm( 18 )
(piz∗− 12(1−η) )( k2 )
δ
}
<
1
2
. (16)
8Note that J1 = max
a
∑N
n=1 gn (a) is the optimal objective, J2 is the second best objective and piz∗ is the component of the
optimal state z∗ (of a∗) in the stationary distribution of the GoT phase Markov chain. We conclude that
R¯ ≤
(a)
E∑
k=1
R¯k ≤
(b)
N
k0∑
k=1
c32
k + 2N
E∑
k=1
(c1 + c2) k
δ ≤
(c)
Nc32
k0+1 + 2 (c1 + c2)N log
1+δ
2
(
T
c3
+ 2
)
(17)
where (a) follows since completing the last epoch to be a full epoch only increases R¯k. In (b) we used (15) for k > k0 and
R¯k ≤ 2N (c1 + c2) kδ +Nc32k for k ≤ k0. Inequality (c) follows from
∑E
k=k0+1
kδ ≤ E1+δ and bounding E using (13).
If either the exploration or the GoT phases fail, the regret becomes linear with T . Like many other bandit algorithms, we
avoid a linear expected regret by ensuring that the error probabilities vanish exponentially with T . By using a single epoch
with a constant duration for the first two phases, we get an alternative formulation of our result, as in [17]. In this case, with
high probability (in T ) our algorithm achieves a constant regret.
Corollary 5. For any η > 0, there exist c1, c2 such that a GoT algorithm with a single epoch (of length T ) has a constant
regret in T with probability of at least 1− η.
Proof: This corollary follows since Pe,k in (22) vanishes with c1 and Pc,1 in (33) vanishes with c2.
IV. THE EXPLORATION PHASE - ESTIMATION OF THE EXPECTED REWARDS
In this section, we describe the exploration phase, and analyze its addition to the expected total regret. At the beginning of
the game, players still do not have any evaluation of the M different arms. They estimate these values on the run, based on
the rewards they get. We propose a pure exploration phase where each player picks an arm uniformly at random, similar to the
one suggested in [17]. Note that in contrast to [17], we do not assume that T is known to the players. Hence, the exploration
phase is repeated in each epoch, with only a constant number c1 of exploration turns in each epoch. However, the estimation
uses all previous exploration phases, so that the number of samples for estimation grows linearly with time.
The estimation of the expected rewards is never perfect. Hence, the optimal solution to the assignment problem given the
estimated expectation might be different from the optimal solution with the correct expectations. However, if the uncertainty
of the true value of each expectation is small enough, we expect both these optimal assignments to coincide. This is exactly
the precision we require from the estimation, as formulated in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. Assume that {µn,i} are known up to an uncertainty of ∆, i.e., |µˆn,i − µn,i| < ∆ for each n and i for some {µˆn,i}.
Denote the optimal assignment by a1 = argmax
a
∑N
n=1 gn (a) and its objective by J1 =
∑N
n=1 gn (a1). Denote the second
best objective and the corresponding assignment by J2 and a2, respectively. If ∆ ≤ J1−J22N then
argmax
a
N∑
n=1
gn (a) = argmax
a
N∑
n=1
µˆn,anηan (a) (18)
so that the optimal assignment does not change due to the uncertainty.
Proof: First note that an optimal solution must not have any collisions, otherwise it can be improved since M ≥ N . Hence
J1 =
∑N
n=1 µn,a1,n . For all n and i we have µˆn,i = µn,i+ zn,i such that |zn,i| < ∆. In the perturbed assignment problem, a1
9performs at least as well as
N∑
n=1
µˆn,a1,n =
N∑
n=1
(
µn,a1,n + zn,i
)
>
N∑
n=1
µn,a1,n −∆N (19)
and any assignment a 6= a1 performs at most as well as
N∑
n=1
µˆn,anηan (a) =
N∑
n=1
(µn,an + zn,i) ηan (a) <
N∑
n=1
µn,a2,nηa2,n (a2) + ∆N. (20)
Therefore, if ∆ ≤ J1−J22N then for every a 6= a1 we have
∑N
n=1 µˆn,a1,n >
∑N
n=1 µˆn,anηan (a), which gives (18).
Note that the requirement on ∆ is too strict and not tight. There need not be a perturbation {zn,i} such that |zn,i| = J1−J22N
which makes the optimal allocation of the perturbed problem different from a1. It is possible only if the allocation a2 that
yields J2 satisfies a2,n 6= a1,n for all n. In general, the linear programming constraints of the assignment problem can be
taken into account to achieve a looser requirement than ∆ < J1−J22N . Moreover, in practice much larger random perturbations
are not likely to change the optimal assignment.
At the end of this phase, players should know their arm expectations accurately enough with high probability. For that to
hold, the duration of the exploration phase has to be long enough. The following lemma concludes this section by providing
an upper bound for the probability that the k-th exploration phase failed, as well as for the probability that at least one of the
last
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1 exploration phases failed.
Lemma 7 (Exploration Error Probability). Assume i.i.d. rewards {rn,i (t)}t as in Definition 1 where bmax = maxn,i bn,i and
σmax = max
n,i
σn,i. Let
{
µkn,i
}
be the estimated reward expectations using all the exploration phases up to epoch k. Denote
a
∗ = argmax
a
∑N
n=1 gn (a) and a
k∗ = argmax
a
∑N
n=1 µ
k
n,anηan (a). Also denote J1 =
∑N
n=1 gn (a
∗) and the second best
objective by J2
1. Denote
w ,
(J1 − J2)2
MN2
(
80σ2max +
40bmax
N (J1 − J2)
) . (21)
If the length of the k-th exploration phase is c1k
δ then after the k-th epoch we have
Pe,k , Pr
(
a
∗ 6= ak∗) ≤ 2NMe−wc1( k2 )δk +NMe− c1( k2 )δ36M2 k. (22)
Furthermore,
Pr
⌊
k
2 ⌋⋃
r=0
Pe,k−r
 ≤ 2NM
1− e−wc1( k4 )δ
e−
w
2 c1(
k
4 )
δ
k +
NM
1− e− 136M2 c1( k4 )
δ e
− 1
72M2
c1( k4 )
δ
k. (23)
Proof: After the k-th exploration phase, the number of samples that are used for estimating the expected rewards is
Te (k) , c1
k∑
i=1
iδ ≥ c1
(
k
2
)δ+1
. (24)
Denote by An,i (t) the indicator that is equal to one if only player n chose arm i at time t. Also define Vn,i (t) ,
∑
τ An,i (τ),
which is the number of visits of player n to arm i with no collision, up to time t and Vmin = min
n,i
Vn,i (t). From Definition
1Note that J2 is the second best objective and not the second best allocation, so J2 < J1. If all allocations have the same objective then Lemma 14 trivially
holds with c1 ≥ 1.
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1, for each n, i and for some positive parameter bn,i we have E
{
|rn,i (t)− µn,i|k
}
≤ 12k!σ2n,ibk−2n,i for all integers k ≥ 3.
Denote by E the event in which there exists a player n that has an estimate of some arm i with an accuracy worse than ∆.
We have
Pr (E|Vmin ≥ v) = Pr
M⋃
i=1
N⋃
n=1

∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Vn,i (t)
Vn,i(t)∑
τ=1
An,i (τ) rn,i (τ)− µn,i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > ∆ |Vmin ≥ v


≤
(a)
NMmax
n,i
Pr

∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Vn,i (t)
Vn,i(t)∑
τ=1
An,i (τ) rn,i (τ) − µn,i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > ∆ |Vmin ≥ v
 ≤
(b)
2NMe
− ∆2
2σ2max+2bmax∆
v
. (25)
where (a) follows by taking the union bound over all players and arms and (b) from using Bernstein’s inequality (see [34,
Page 205]). Since the exploration phase consists of uniform and independent arm choices we have
Pr (An,i (t) = 1) =
1
M
(
1− 1
M
)N−1
. (26)
Therefore
Pr
(
Vmin <
Te (k)
5M
)
= Pr
([
M⋃
i=1
N⋃
n=1
{
Vn,i (t) <
Te (k)
5M
}])
≤
(a)
NM Pr
(
V1,1 (t) <
Te (k)
5M
)
≤
(b)
NMe
−2 1
M2
(
(1− 1M )
N−1− 15
)2
Te(k) ≤
(c)
NMe−
1
18M2
Te(k) (27)
where (a) follows from the union bound, (b) from Hoeffding’s inequality for Bernoulli random variables and (c) since M ≥ N
and
(
1− 1M
)M−1 − 15 ≥ e−1 − 15 > 16 . We conclude that
Pr (E) =
Te(k)∑
v=0
Pr (E|Vmin = v) Pr (Vmin = v) ≤
⌊Te(k)5M ⌋∑
v=0
Pr (Vmin = v) +
Te(k)∑
v=⌊Te(k)5M ⌋+1
Pr (E|Vmin = v) Pr (Vmin = v) ≤ Pr
(
Vmin <
Te (k)
5M
)
+ Pr
(
E| Vmin ≥ Te (k)
5M
)
≤
(a)
2NMe
− ∆2Te(k)
M(10σ2max+10bmax∆) +NMe−
Te(k)
18M2 =
(b)
2NMe
−
∆2c1( k2 )
δ
M(20σ2max+20bmax∆)
k
+NMe−
c1( k2 )
δ
36M2
k (28)
where (a) follows from (25) and (27), and (b) from (24). By requiring∆ = J1−J22N we know from Lemma 6 that Pr
(
a
∗ 6= ak∗) ≤
Pr (E), which together with (28) establishes (22). Now denote w = (J1−J2)
2
MN2(80σ2max+
40bmax
N
(J1−J2)) . We obtain
Pr
⌊
k
2 ⌋⋃
r=0
Pe,k−r
 ≤
(a)
2NM
⌊ k2 ⌋∑
r=0
e−wc1(
k−r
2 )
δ
(k−r) +NM
⌊ k2 ⌋∑
r=0
e−
c1
36M2
( k−r2 )
δ
(k−r) ≤
(b)
2NMe−wc1(
k
4 )
δ
k
⌊ k2 ⌋∑
r=0
ewc1(
k
4 )
δ
r +NMe−
c1
36M2
( k4 )
δ
k
⌊ k2 ⌋∑
r=0
e
c1
36M2
( k4 )
δ
r ≤
(c)
2NMe−wc1(
k
4 )
δ
k e
wc1( k4 )
δ( k2+1) − 1
ewc1(
k
4 )
δ − 1
+NMe−
c1
36M2
( k4 )
δ
k e
1
36M2
c1( k4 )
δ( k2+1) − 1
e
1
36M2
c1( k4 )
δ
− 1
≤
2NM
1− e−wc1( k4 )δ
e−
w
2 c1(
k
4 )
δ
k +
NM
1− e− 136M2 c1( k4 )
δ
e−
1
72M2
c1( k4 )
δ
k
(29)
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where (a) follows by using the union bound on (28) , (b) follows since e−wc1(
k−r
2 )
δ
(k−r) ≤ e−wc1( k4 )δ(k−r) for r ≤ ⌊k2 ⌋, and
(c) is the geometric series formula.
V. GAME OF THRONES DYNAMICS PHASE
In this section, we analyze the game of thrones (GoT) dynamics between players. These dynamics guarantee that the optimal
state will be played a significant amount of time, and only require the players to know their own action and the received payoff
on each turn. Note that these dynamics assume deterministic utilities. We use the estimated expected reward of each arm as
the utility for this step, and zero if a collision occurred. This means that players ignore the numerical reward they receive by
choosing the arm, as long as it is positive.
Definition 8. The game of thrones G of epoch k has the N players of the original multi-armed bandit game. Each player can
choose from among the M arms, so An = {1, ...,M} for each n. The utility of player n in the strategy profile a = (a1, ..., aN )
is
un (a) = µ
k
n,anηan (a) (30)
where µkn,an is the estimation of the expected reward of arm an, from all the exploration phases that have ended, up to epoch
k. Also denote un,max = max
a
un (a).
Our dynamics belong to the family introduced in [31]–[33]. These are powerful dynamics that guarantee that the optimal
strategy profile (in terms of the sum of utilities) will be played a sufficiently large portion of the turns. However, [31]–[33]
all rely on the following structural property of the game, called interdependence.
Definition 9. A game G with finite action spaces A1, ...,AN is interdependent if for every strategy profile a ∈ A1× ...×AN
and every set of players J ⊂ N , there exists a player n /∈ J and a choice of actions a′J ∈
∏
m∈J Am such that un (a′J ,a−J) 6=
un (aJ ,a−J).
Our GoT is not interdependent. To see this, pick a strategy profile a such that some players are in a collision while others
are not. Choose J as the set of players that are not in a collision. All players outside J are in a collision, and there does not
exist any colliding player such that the actions of the non-colliding players can make her utility non-zero.
Our GoT Dynamics, described in Subsection III-A, modify [32] such that interdependency is no longer needed. In comparison
to [32], our dynamics assign zero probability that a player with un = 0 (in a collision) will be content. Additionally, we do
not need to keep the benchmark utility as part of the state. A player knows with probability 1 whether there was a collision,
and if there was not, she gets the same utility for the same arm.
The exploration of the GoT dynamics has a different purpose than the exploration during the exploration phase of Algorithm
1. It is meant to allow the players to reach the optimal strategy profile. Since the GoT must have well-defined and time-invariant
utility functions, the reward samples from the GoT phase cannot be used to change the estimation for the arm expectations
already in the current epoch. However, players can use these samples in the next epoch and improve the accuracy of their
estimation by doing so. While it does not improve our regret analysis, it can enhance the algorithm’s performance in practice.
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The GoT dynamics (see Subsection 3.1) induce a Markov chain over the state space Z =
∏N
n=1 (An ×M), where M =
{C,D}. We denote the transition matrix of this Markov chain by P ε. We are interested in the invariant distribution of P ε,
which, for small ε, is concentrated only on the states with an optimal sum of utilities. However, it is only guaranteed that
the dynamics will visit these optimal states very often for a small enough ε. There could be multiple optimal states and the
dynamics might fluctuate between them. This could prevent players on distributedly agreeing which optimal state to play.
Fortunately, in our case of the assignment, as shown in the following lemma, there is a unique optimal state with probability
one. This result arises from the continuous distribution of the rewards that makes the distribution of the empirical estimation
for the expectations continuous as well.
Lemma 10. The optimal solution to max
a
∑N
n=1 un (a) is unique with probability 1.
Proof: First note that an optimal solution must not have any collisions, otherwise it can be improved since M ≥ N .
Let
{
µkn,i
}
be the estimated reward expectations in epoch k. For two different solutions a˜ 6= a∗ to be optimal, we must
have
∑N
n=1 µ
k
n,a˜n
=
∑N
n=1 µ
k
n,a∗n
. However, a˜ and a∗ must differ in at least one assignment. Since the distributions of
the rewards rn,an are continuous, so are the distributions of
∑N
n=1 µ
k
n,an (as a sum of the average of the rewards). Hence
Pr
(∑N
n=1 µ
k
n,a˜n
=
∑N
n=1 µ
k
n,a∗n
)
= 0, and the result follows.
Next we prove a lower bound on the probability for the unique optimal state z∗ in the stationary distribution of the GoT
dynamics. This lower bound is a function of ε, and hence allows for a choice of ε that guarantees that piz∗ >
1
2 . Note that
the analysis in [32] cannot be applied here since our game is not interdependent. Moreover, our proof only requires that
c >
∑
n un,max − J1 where J1 is the optimal objective. This significantly improves the c > N requirement in [32], and has a
crucial effect on the mixing time of the GoT dynamics and therefore on the convergence rate to the optimal state. Note that
the analysis in [32] assumed utilities that are in [0, 1] so
∑
n un,max ≤ N .
The following notion is often useful for the analysis of perturbed Markov chains.
Definition 11. Let Z be a finite set and let zr ∈ Z . A graph consisting of edges z′ → z such that z′ ∈ Z \ {zr} and z ∈ Z
is called a {zr}-graph if it satisfies the following conditions:
1) Every point z′ ∈ Z \ {zr} is the initial point of exactly one edge.
2) For any point z′ ∈ Z \ {zr} there exists a sequence of edges leading from it to zr.
Definition 12. We denote by G (zr) the set of {zr}-graphs and by g a specific graph. A graph in G (zr) is a tree rooted in zr
such that from every z′ 6= zr there is a path to zr. This follows since the two conditions above imply that there are no closed
cycles in a {zr}-graph.
The following lemma provides an explicit expression for the stationary distribution of a Markov chain.
Lemma 13 ( [35, Lemma 3.1, Chapter 6]). Let us consider a Markov chain with set of states Z and transition probabilities Pz′z
and assume that every state can be reached from any other state in a finite number of steps. Then the stationary distribution
of the chain is
pi (z) =
Q (z)∑
z′∈Z Q (z′)
(31)
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where
Q (z) =
∑
g∈G(z)
∏
(z′→z)∈g
Pz′z. (32)
Using the lemma above, we can prove the following lower bound on piz∗ as a function of ε. The proof for this theorem is
constructive and shows an explicit requirement on ε in terms of the problem parameters.
Theorem 14. Let ε > 0 and denote the stationary distribution of Z by pi. Denote ak∗ = argmax
a
∑N
n=1 un (a) and let the
optimal state be z∗ =
[
a
k∗, CN
]
. Denote J1 =
∑N
n=1 un
(
a
k∗). If c >∑n un,max − J1 then for any 0 < η < 12 there exists
a small enough ε such that piz∗ >
1
2(1−η) .
Proof: See Appendix A.
We need that piz∗ >
1
2 in order for the GoT phase to succeed. The main importance of the theorem above is to show that a
small enough ε, such that piz∗ >
1
2 , exists. However, the proof of Theorem 14 also tells which ε values are small enough to
guarantee that piz∗ >
1
2 , as a function of the problem parameters N,M and the matrix of utilities {un}. The designer that has
to choose ε does not typically know the parameters of the problem but rather a random model for them. Using the underlying
random model, the designer can choose ε that is very likely to be small enough. This is another important aspect of Theorem
14.
Next we prove a probabilistic lower bound on the number of times the optimal state has been played during the k-th GoT
phase.
Lemma 15. Denote ak∗ = argmax
a
∑N
n=1 un (a) and let the optimal state be z
∗ =
[
a
k∗, CN
]
. Denote the stationary
distribution of Z by pi. Denote by Gk the set of turns that constitute the k-th GoT phase. Then for any 0 < η < 1 we
have, for a sufficiently large k, that
Pc,1 , Pr
(∑
t∈Gk
I (z (t) = z∗) ≤ (1− η)piz∗c2kδ
)
≤ c ‖ϕk‖pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ak
e
− η
2piz∗c2k
δ
72Tm( 18 ) (33)
where I is the indicator function, c is a constant independent of η and piz∗ , ϕk is the probability distribution of the state
played in the k − ⌊k2 ⌋− 1-th exploitation phase, and
‖ϕk‖pi ,
√√√√ |Z|∑
i=1
ϕ2k,i
pii
. (34)
Proof: The events I (z (t) = z∗) are not independent but rather form a Markov chain, so Markovian concentration
inequalities are required. The result readily follows by using the concentration bound in [36, Theorem 3]. Our function is
f (z) = I (z = z∗), which counts the number of visits to the optimal state. We denote by Tm
(
1
8
)
the mixing time of Z with
an accuracy of 18 . The initial state is the state zˆk played in the k −
⌊
k
2
⌋− 1 exploitation phase.
The next lemma concludes this section by providing an upper bound for the probability that the k-th exploitation phase
failed due to the last
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1 GoT phases (including the k-th GoT phase).
Lemma 16 (GoT Error Probability). Denote ak∗ = argmax
a
∑N
n=1 un (a). Let the optimal state of the k-th GoT phase be
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zk∗ =
[
a
k∗, CN
]
. Denote by Gk the set of turns that constitute the k-th GoT phase. Define the number of times the optimal
state has been played in the last
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1 GoT phases combined by
Fk (z
∗) ,
k∑
i=k−⌊ k2 ⌋
∑
t∈Gi
I
(
z (t) = zi∗
)
. (35)
Denote piz∗ = min
k−⌊ k2 ⌋≤i≤k
pizi∗ . If piz∗ >
1
2(1−η) for some 0 < η <
1
2 then we have for a sufficiently large k that
Pc,k , Pr
Fk (z∗) ≤ 1
2
k∑
i=k−⌊ k2 ⌋
c2i
δ
 ≤ (C0e− η2144Tm( 18 ) (piz∗− 12(1−η) )( k2 )δ
)k
. (36)
where C0 is a constant that is independent of k, piz∗ and η.
Proof: Denote the total length of the last
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ 1 GoT phases by Lk = c2
∑k
i=k−⌊ k2 ⌋ i
δ. Define the random variables
Si =
∑
t∈Gi I (z (t) = z
∗) for each i. For any t > 0, Chernoff bound on (35) yields
Pr
 k∑
i=k−⌊ k2 ⌋
Si ≤ Lk
2
| {zi (0)}k
i=k−⌊ k2 ⌋
 ≤ etLk2 k∏
i=k−⌊ k2 ⌋
E
{
e−tSi | zi (0)} (37)
where zi (0) is the initial state at the beginning of the i-th GoT phase. For t =
η2
1−η
72Tm( 18 )
we have the following bound
E
{
e−tSi | zi (0)} ≤
(a)
Pc,1 · 1 + (1− Pc,1) · e−t(1−η)piz∗c2iδ ≤
(b)
(1 +Ai) e
− η
2piz∗c2i
δ
72Tm( 18 ) (38)
where (a) is since e−tSi ≤ 1 and (b) follows from Lemma 15 on Pc,1. Plugging (38) back into (37) and using the law of total
expectation over
{
zi (0)
}k
i=k−⌊ k2 ⌋ gives
Pr
 k∑
i=k−⌊ k2 ⌋
Si ≤ Lk
2
 ≤
(a)
 k∏
i=k−⌊ k2 ⌋
(
1 + Ez
i(0) {Ai}
) e
η2
1−η
72Tm( 18 )
Lk
2
e
− η
2piz∗
72Tm( 18 )
Lk
≤
(b)
Ck0 e
− η2
72Tm( 18 )
(piz∗− 12(1−η) )Lk ≤
(c)
(
C0e
− η2
144Tm( 18 )
(piz∗− 12(1−η) )( k2 )
δ
)k
(39)
where (a) follows since
∏k
i=k−⌊ k2 ⌋ e
−ac2iδ = e
−a∑k
i=k−⌊k2 ⌋ c2i
δ
for any a. In (b), note that for every zi (0) we have Ai =
c ‖ϕi‖pi for some constant c, so Ez
i(0) {Ai} is bounded by some constant for any i so the above bound vanishes with k.
However, by choosing zi (0) to be the state played in the i − ⌊ i2⌋ − 1 exploitation phase, the same bound guarantees that
Pr
(
zi (0) = zi∗
) → 1 as i → ∞, so E {‖ϕi‖pi} → 1√pizi∗ < √2. Inequality (c) uses Lk = ∑ki=k−⌊ k2 ⌋ c2iδ ≥ k2 (k2 )δ . Note
that the counting in (35) is on the same optimal state zi∗ = z∗ for k − ⌊k2 ⌋ ≤ i ≤ k only if the previous ⌊k2 ⌋+ 1 exploration
phases succeeded.
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VI. MARKOVIAN REWARDS
In this section, we generalize our main result to the case of (rested) Markovian rewards. This generalization is valid for
the same GoT algorithm (Algorithm 1) without any modifications. In this section we assume that each player can observe
her collision indicator in addition to her reward. The reason for this additional assumption is that with discrete rewards, the
collision indicator cannot be deduced from the rewards with probability 1. Nevertheless, knowing whether other players chose
the same arm is a very modest requirement compared to assuming that players can observe the actions of other players. Note
that if the collision indicator is known, whether colliding players receive zero or some arbitrary reward has no effect on the
algorithm or the analysis. The reward in a collision is simply ignored in all phases. Nevertheless, for clarity, we keep assuming
that a collision yields zero reward.
We use the standard model for Markovian bandits (see for example [37]). As in the i.i.d. case, we assume that the reward
processes (now Markov chains) of players are independent.
Definition 17. Denote by Vn,i (t) the number of visits without collision of player n to arm i, up to turn t. The sequence of
rewards {rn,i (Vn,i)} of arm i for player n is an ergodic Markov chain such that:
1) rn,i (Vn,i) has a finite state space Rn,i for each n, i.
2) The transition matrix of rn,i (Vn,i) is Pn,i and the stationary distribution is pi
n,i.
3) The Markov chains {rn,i (Vn,i)} are independent for different n or different i.
The total regret is now defined as
Definition 18. The expectation of arm i for player n is defined as
µn,i =
∑
r∈Rn,i
rpin,i (r) . (40)
Denote the expected utility of player n in strategy profile a by gn (a) = µn,anηan (a). The total regret is defined as the
random variable
R =
T∑
t=1
N∑
n=1
gn (a
∗)−
T∑
t=1
N∑
n=1
rn,an(t) (Vn,i (t)) ηan(t) (a (t)) (41)
where
a
∗ = argmax
a
N∑
n=1
gn (a) . (42)
The expected total regret R¯ , E {R} is the average of (41) over the randomness of the rewards {rn,i (Vn,i)}, that dictate the
random actions {an (t)}.
The division into epochs and phases makes the generalization of our algorithm to other reward models comfortable. The
only phase that requires a different analysis is the exploration phase. By estimating accurate enough expected rewards (now
defined in (40)), the GoT phase is played over the GoT with these estimations as the utilities, where the utility in a collision is
always set to zero. This is formalized in the following theorem. As before, an explicit requirement on ε is given in the proof
of Theorem 14.
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Theorem 19 (Generalization to Markovian Rewards). Assume that the rewards {rn,i (Vn,i)} are Markovian as in Definition 17.
Assume that for every n, i, the stationary distribution of rn,i (Vn,i), denoted pi
n,i, is generated at random using a continuous
distribution on the M dimensional simplex. Let the game have a finite horizon T , unknown to the players. Let each player
play according to Algorithm 1, with c1, c2, c3, δ > 0 and a small enough ε. Then, for large enough T , the expected total regret
is bounded by
R¯ ≤ 4 (c1 + c2)N log1+δ2
(
T
c3
+ 2
)
= O
(
log1+δ T
)
. (43)
Proof: First note that an optimal solution must not have any collisions, otherwise it can be improved since M ≥ N . Since
the stationary distributions are continuously distributed, the expected rewards {µn,i} defined in (40) are also continuously
distributed and so is
∑N
n=1 µn,a˜n . For two different solutions a˜ 6= a∗ to be optimal, they must have
∑N
n=1 µn,a˜n =
∑N
n=1 µn,a∗n .
However, they must differ in at least one assignment. Hence Pr
(∑N
n=1 µn,a˜n =
∑N
n=1 µn,a∗n
)
= 0, so there is a unique solution
to (42) with probability 1. If the exploration phase of the k-th epoch did not fail, then the solution to max
a
∑N
n=1 µ
k
n,an is
identical to this unique solution.
The rest of the proof replaces the exploration error bound in Lemma 7. The estimated expected rewards µˆn,i are now defined
with respect to the stationary distribution of the reward chain. However, there is still a single estimated value for each player
and arm and the role and performance of the GoT phase remain the same. Hence, we need to show that the exploration phase
results in an accurate enough estimation of µn,i.
As in (24), after the k-th exploration phase, the number of samples that are used for estimating the expected rewards is
Te (k) ≥ c1
(
k
2
)δ+1
. Denote by Tn,i
(
1
8
)
the mixing time of rn,i (t) with an accuracy of
1
8 . We define for the initial distribution
ϕ on Rn,i
‖ϕ‖pin,i ,
√√√√|Rn,i|∑
j=1
ϕ2j
pin,i (j)
. (44)
Denote by An,i (t) the indicator that is equal to one if only player n chose arm i at time t. Also define Vn,i (t) ,
∑
τ An,i (τ),
which is the number of visits of player n to arm i with no collision, up to time t and Vmin = min
n,i
Vn,i (t). Denote by E the
event in which there exists a player n that has an estimate of some arm i with an accuracy worse than ∆. We have
Pr (E|Vmin ≥ v) = Pr
M⋃
i=1
N⋃
n=1

∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1Vn,i (t)
Vn,i(t)∑
τ=1
An,i (τ) rn,i (τ)− µn,i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ∆ |Vmin ≥ v


≤
(a)
NMmax
n,i
Pr
(
v∑
τ=1
An,i (τ) rn,i (τ) ≥
(
1 +
∆
µn,i
)
µn,iv |Vmin ≥ v
)
+
NMmax
n,i
Pr
(
v∑
τ=1
An,i (τ) rn,i (τ) ≤
(
1− ∆
µn,i
)
µn,iv |Vmin ≥ v
)
≤
(b)
2cmax
n,i
(
‖ϕ‖pin,i
)
e
− ∆2
72max
n,i
(µn,iTn,i( 18 ))
v
. (45)
where (a) follows by taking the union bound over all players and arms and (b) from using the bound in [36] with η = ∆µn,i
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(so 0 < η < 1 when ∆ < µn,i), where c is a constant independent of η and piz∗ . We conclude that
Pr (E) =
Te(k)∑
v=0
Pr (E|Vmin = v) Pr (Vmin = v) ≤
⌊Te(k)5M ⌋∑
v=0
Pr (Vmin = v) +
Te(k)∑
v=⌊Te(k)5M ⌋+1
Pr (E|Vmin = v) Pr (Vmin = v) ≤ Pr
(
Vmin <
Te (k)
5M
)
+
Pr
(
E| Vmin ≥ Te (k)
5M
)
≤
(a)
2NMcmax
n,i
(
‖ϕ‖pin,i
)
e
−
∆2c1( k2 )
δ
720
(
max
n,i
µn,iTn,i( 18 )
)
M
k
+NMe−
c1( k2 )
δ
36M2
k. (46)
where (a) follows from (45) and (27), that still holds since arm choices are independent and uniform in the exploration phase.
Finally, by requiring ∆ = J1−J22N we know from Lemma 6 that Pr
(
a
∗ 6= ak∗) ≤ Pr (E), which together with (46) establishes
the same bound (up to a constant factor) as in (22) but with w˜ = (J1−J2)
2
2880
(
max
n,i
µn,iTn,i( 18 )
)
N2M
replacing w. Using this new
bound, the proof of 4 remains the same using w˜ instead of w.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we illustrate the behavior of Algorithm 1 using numerical simulations. We use δ = 0 since it yields good
results in practice. We conjecture that the bound (33) is not tight for our particular Markov chain and indicator function,
since it applies to all Markov chains with the same mixing time and all functions on the states. This explains why modest
choices of c2 are large enough and the k
δ factor in the exponent is not needed in practice. The lengths of the phases should
be chosen so that the exploitation phase already occupies most of the turns in early epochs, while allowing for a considerable
GoT phase. In the implementation of our algorithm we also use the GoT and exploration phases for estimating the expected
rewards, which improves the estimation significantly in practice, making the GoT phase the main issue. We chose the parameter
c =
log
(
2
c2N
)
log ε ≈ 1.4 (for ε = 0.01), in order for the escape probability from a content state to be εc = 2c2N , with an expectation
of approximately 2 escapes in each GoT phase. Note that this choice is a significant relaxation from c = N (the lowest possible
value in [32]), and has a dramatic positive effect on the mixing time of the GoT Dynamics and the convergence time. The
rewards are generated as rn,i (t) = µn,i + zn,i (t) where {µn,i} are taken from a matrix U and {zn,i (t)} are independent
Gaussian variables with zero mean and a variance of σ2 = 0.05 for each n, i.
First we demonstrate our theoretical result in the following scenario with N = M = 3:
U =

0.1 0.05 0.9
0.1 0.25 0.3
0.4 0.2 0.8

for which the optimal allocation is a1 = 3, a2 = 2, a1 = 1. Here we used c1 = 500, c2 = c3 = 6000. The expected total
regret as a function of time, averaged over 100 realizations of the algorithm, is depicted in Fig. 2. After the second epoch,
all epochs lead to the optimal solution in their exploitation phase. It can be seen that the regret increases like O (log2 T ), and
more specifically, is between 400 log2 T and 700 log2 T . This demonstrates the theoretical result of Theorem 4.
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The total regret compares the sum of utilities to the ideal one that could have been achieved in a centralized scenario. With
no communication between players and with a matrix of expected rewards, the gap from this ideal naturally increases. In
this scenario, converging to the exact optimal solution might take a long time, even for the (unknown) optimal algorithm. A
nice property of our algorithm that makes it appealing in practice is that the GoT dynamics are not specifically oriented to
converging to the optimal solution, but they probabilistically prefer states with a higher sum of utilities. This is simply because
these states have incoming paths with high probabilities (i.e., “low resistance”). To demonstrate this property, we generated
100 independent realizations of U with elements that were chosen uniformly at random in [0.05, 0.95]. In Fig. 3, we present
the sample mean of the accumulated sum of utilities
∑N
n=1
1
t
∑t
τ=1 un (a (τ)) as a function of time t and averaged over 100
experiments for M = N = 5. Here we used c1 = 500, c2 = c3 = 60000. The performance was normalized by the optimal
solution to the assignment problem (for each U ) and compared to the performance of a random choice of arms. Clearly the
sum of utilities becomes close to optimal (more than 90%) fast, with only a small variation between different realizations of
U . Additionally, our algorithm behaved very similarly for a wide range of ε values (two orders of magnitude). This supports
the intuition that there is no threshold phenomenon on ε (becoming “small enough”), since the dynamics prefer states with
higher sum of utilities for all ε < 1.
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Fig. 2. Total Regret for N = M = 3 as a function of time, averaged over 100 simulations
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Fig. 3. Sample mean of the sum of utilities for N = M = 5 as a function of time, averaged over 100 simulations
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
In this paper, we considered a multi-player multi-armed bandit game where players compete over the arms as resources. In
contrast to all other multi-player bandit problems, we both allow for different expected rewards between users and assume
users only know their actions and rewards. We proposed a novel fully distributed algorithm that achieves an expected total
regret of near-O (logT ), when the horizon T is unknown by the players.
Our simulations suggest that tuning the parameters for our algorithm is a relatively easy task in practice. The designer can
do so by simulating a random model for the unknown environment and varying the parameters, knowing that only very slack
accuracy is needed for the tuning.
Analytically, a single epoch in our algorithm converges to the optimal solution of the assignment problem with high
probability. This might be valuable even outside the context of bandit learning algorithms, since it is the first fully distributed
algorithm that solves the assignment problem exactly. Our dynamics may take a long time to converge in terms of N . While
this does not effect the regret for large T , it might be significant if our algorithm were to be used for this purpose. Our game
is not a general one but has a structure that allowed us to modify the dynamics such that the interdependence assumption can
be dropped. We conjecture that this structure can also be exploited to accelerate the converge rate of this kind of dynamics.
Studying the converge time of perhaps further refined dynamics is another promising future research direction.
IX. APPENDIX A - PROOF OF THEOREM 14
In this section we prove Theorem 14, which bounds from below the probability of z∗ in the stationary distribution of Z .
From Lemma 13 we know that
piz∗ =
1
1 +
∑
zr∈Z,zr 6=z∗
∑
g∈G(zr)
∏
(z′→z)∈g Pz′z∑
g∈G(z∗)
∏
(z′→z)∈g Pz′z︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
. (47)
In Subsection IX-A, we bound the denominator of A from below by identifying the maximal term in the sum (the trees in
G (z∗) with the maximal probability). In Subsection IX-B we upper bound the numerator of A.
A. The Maximal Probability Tree
For each zr, the dominant term in (32) is
max
g∈G(zr)
∏
(z′→z)∈g
Pz′z. (48)
We decompose the transition probabilities as follows
Pz′z = Pr (z | z′) = Pr (Mz, a¯z |Mz′ , a¯z′) = Pr (a¯z |Mz′ , a¯z′) Pr (Mz |Mz′ , a¯z′ , a¯z) . (49)
So the objective becomes
∏
(z′→z)∈g
Pz′z =
∏
(z′→z)∈g
Pr (a¯z |Mz′ , a¯z′)
∏
(z′→z)∈g
Pr (Mz |Mz′ , a¯z′ , a¯z) . (50)
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We denote the strategy profile associated with zr by a
zr and Jzr = max
a
∑N
n=1 un (a
zr). Throughout the proof we use the
following definition.
Define Zd as the set of states for which exactly d players are discontent (so N − d players are content).
We first provide an upper bound for (48) by upper bounding each factor in (50) separately. We then construct a specific tree
g ∈ G (zr) that achieves the upper bound.
1) Upper bounding the probability of personal state transition -
∏
(z′→z)∈g Pr (Mz |Mz′ , a¯z′ , a¯z) : If zr ∈ Z0 then in the
path from zN ∈ ZN to zr, the personal state of each player needs to change from discontent to content with azr . This occurs
with a probability of no more than
(∏N
n=1
un(a
zr )
un,max
)
ε
∑
n
un,max−Jzr since each transition to content with un is only possible
with probability unun,max ε
un,max−un (see (9)). From the second constraint on G (zr) (see Definition 5), this path exists in any
tree in G (zr) such that zr ∈ Z0. We conclude that for any zr ∈ Z0
∏
(z′→z)∈g
Pr (Mz |Mz′ , a¯z′ , a¯z) ≤ ε
∑
n un,max−Jz
N∏
n=1
un (a
zr )
un,max
. (51)
If zr ∈ Zd for d ≥ 1 then trivially ∏
(z′→z)∈g
Pr (Mz |Mz′ , a¯z′ , a¯z) ≤ 1. (52)
2) Upper Bounding the probability of choosing a different arm -
∏
(z′→z)∈g Pr (a¯z |Mz′ , a¯z′): Assume that ε <
(
1− 1M
) 1
c
so ε
c
M−1 < (1− εc). We use the first constraint on G (zr) (see Definition 5) and count the most likely outgoing edges from
each non-root state.
1) Any outgoing transition from z′ ∈ Z0 is bounded by the maximal probability transition (in (6))
Pr (a¯z |Mz′ , a¯z′ , d = 0) ≤ (1− εc)N−1 ε
c
M − 1 (53)
even if the total state transition is infeasible.
2) Any outgoing transition from z′ ∈ Zd for d ≥ 1 is bounded by the maximal probability transition (in (6) and (7))
Pr (a¯z |Mz′ , a¯z′ , d ≥ 1) ≤ (1− εc)N−d 1
Md
(54)
even if the total state transition is infeasible.
Since all z ∈ Z \ {zr} must have a single outgoing edge in g, going over all paths in (z′ → z) ∈ g must at least include all
these outgoing edges. By sorting these outgoing edges according to the number of discontent players in their source state, we
conclude that for zr ∈ Z0
∏
(z′→z)∈g
Pr (a¯z |Mz′ , a¯z′) ≤
(
(1− εc)N−1 εc
M − 1
)
|Z0|−1
N∏
d′=1
(
(1− εc)N−d′ 1
Md′
)|Zd′ |
(55)
and for zr ∈ Zd for d ≥ 1 we have
∏
(z′→z)∈g
Pr (a¯z |Mz′ , a¯z′) ≤ M
d
(1− εc)N−d
(
(1− εc)N−1 εc
M − 1
)
|Z0|
N∏
d′=1
(
(1− εc)N−d′ 1
Md′
)|Zd′ |
(56)
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where the factor M
d
(1−εc)N−d compensates for counting one Zd state too many (the root).
3) Upper Bounding
∏
(z′→z)∈g Pz′z: Define
A (ε,N,M) =
(
(1− εc)N−1 εc
M − 1
)|Z0|−1 N∏
d′=1
(
(1− εc)N−d′ 1
Md′
)|Zd′ |
. (57)
Gathering the terms together, we conclude that
max
g∈G(zr)
∏
(z′→z)∈g
Pz′z ≤
{ (∏N
n=1
un(a
zr )
un,max
)
ε
∑
n un,max−JzrA (ε,N,M) zr ∈ Z0
(1− εc)d−1 MdM−1εcA (ε,N,M) zr ∈ Zd, d ≥ 1
. (58)
4) Constructing a tree that achieves the bound in (58) : Now we construct a specific tree in G (zr) that achieves the upper
bound of (58), and hence must maximize (48). We call this tree the maximal tree of zr. This tree consists solely of the
maximal probability outgoing edges of each state, which is why it achieves the upper bound from the previous subsection.
Fig. 4 illustrates the maximal tree of a content state z0 ∈ Z0 for N = M = 2. Note that the maximal probability path between
two states is not necessarily the shortest one. For instance, there is a single edge in Z from the lower content state to the root,
with a probability of ε2c. However, for c > umax,1−u1+umax,2−u2 and a small enough ε, the probability of the most likely
path is (1− εc) εcεumax,1−u1+umax,2−u2 .
The maximal tree is constructed as follows:
1) Connect all z0 ∈ Z0 to some state z2 ∈ Z2 with a probability of (1− εc)N−1 εcM−1 . This is possible since the player
that changed her arm (with a probability of ε
c
M−1 ) chooses the arm of one of the other players, making both of them
discontent with probability 1 since they both receive un = 0.
2) Connect all zd ∈ Zd with 1 ≤ d < N2 to some state zd′ ∈ Zd′ with d′ > d with a probability of (1− εc)N−d 1Md . This
is possible when all the discontent players choose, with a probability of 1Md , one or more of the arms of the content
players (all kept their arms with a probability of (1− εc)N−d), thus making all the colliding players discontent with
probability 1.
3) Repeat Step 2 for zd′ ∈ Zd′ until d′ ≥ N2 .
4) Connect all zd ∈ Zd with N2 ≤ d < N to some state zN ∈ ZN with a probability of 1Md . This is possible since the
discontent players together can choose all the arms of the content players. Hence, after this transition, all players receive
un = 0 and become discontent with probability one.
5) Choose z˜N ∈ ZN such that all players are in a collision. Connect all other zN ∈ ZN to z˜N with a probability of 1MN .
This is possible since all players become discontent with probability 1 due to the collision.
6) If zr ∈ ZN then pick z˜N as the root. Otherwise if zr ∈ Z0 then disconnect the outgoing edge of zr from step 1 and
connect z˜N ∈ ZN to zr with a probability of 1MN
(∏N
n=1
un(a
zr )
un,max
)
ε
∑
n un,max−Jzr .
If the root is zr ∈ ZN then we have constructed gN ∈ G (zr) with
∏
(z′→z)∈g
Pz′z = (1− εc)N−1 M
N
M − 1ε
cA (ε,N,M) . (59)
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If the root is zr ∈ Z0, then we have constructed g˜N ∈ G (zr) with
∏
(z′→z)∈g
Pz′z =
(
N∏
n=1
un (a
zr)
un,max
)
ε
∑
n un,max−JzrA (ε,N,M) . (60)
The maximal tree of zr is depicted in Fig. 4. This is indeed a tree since any vertex has one outgoing edge, and all vertices
have a path to the root. We denote by G∗ the number of maximal trees of z∗.
C1,C2
D1,D2
C1,D2
D1,D1
D2,D1
D2,C1
C2,C1
D2,D2
C2,D1D1,C2
Zr
D
Zc2 Zc3Zc1
C/D
Fig. 4. The maximal tree of zr ∈ Z0 , for N = M = 2 and for the general case. C1,D2 is the state where player 1 is content with arm 1 and player 2 is
discontent with arm 2.
B. Upper Bounding the Probability of all non z∗ trees
We are left with upper bounding
∑
zr∈Z,zr 6=z∗
∑
g∈G(zr)
∏
(z′→z)∈g Pz′z . First we identify a probability factor that appears
in
∏
(z′→z)∈g Pz′z for every tree g. In any possible outgoing edge from zd ∈ Zd there is a probability of 1Md for the action
choices of the d discontent players. In a similar manner, there is a factor of ε
c
M−1 in the probability of any possible outgoing
edge from any z0 ∈ Z0. Hence, any tree has
B (ε,N,M) =
(
εc
M − 1
)|Z0|−1 N∏
d′=1
(
1
Md′
)|Zd′ |
(61)
as a factor of
∏
(z′→z)∈g Pz′z . Moreover:
1) All trees g ∈ G (zr) with zr ∈ Z0 have a factor of
∏N
n=1
un(a
zr )
un,max
ε
∑
n un,max−Jzr in
∏
(z′→z)∈g Pz′z since there must
exist a path from any zN ∈ ZN to the root, and all players change from being discontent to being content with azr at
least once on this path.
2) All trees g ∈ G (zr) with zr /∈ Z0 must have a factor of
(
εc
M−1
)|Z0|
(instead of
(
εc
M−1
)|Z0|−1
) in
∏
(z′→z)∈g Pz′z since
there are |Z0| nodes from Z0 to be connected.
Now we divide all the trees in G (z) into different categories. Define azl,q as the number of trees in G (z) that have an l
extra εun,max−un < 1 factors and q extra εc factors, when extra means more than the factors that must exist in any tree as
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argued above. Note that since there are N players and |Z| − 1 edges in every tree, l and q cannot exceed N |Z|. Denote
a
n
max = argmax
a
un (a) and define
α = min
n
min
a 6=anmax
(un,max − un (a)) . (62)
Also denote J0 ,
∑
n un,max. Using the above definitions, we can write
∑
zr∈Z,z 6=z∗
∑
g∈G(zr)
∏
(z′→z)∈g
Pz′z = B (ε,N,M)
εc
M − 1
N∑
d=1
∑
zr∈Zd
∑
g∈G(zr)
∏
(z′→z)∈g Pz′z
εc
M−1B (ε,N,M)
+
B (ε,N,M)
∑
zr∈Z0,z 6=z∗
εJ0−Jzr
N∏
n=1
un (a
zr)
un,max
∑
g∈G(zr)
∏
(z′→z)∈g Pz′z
εJ0−Jzr
∏N
n=1
un(azr )
un,max
B (ε,N,M)
≤
(a)
B (ε,N,M)
 εc
M − 1
N∑
d=1
Md
∑
zr∈Zd
N |Z|∑
l=0
N |Z|∑
q=0
azrl,qε
lαεqc +
∑
zr∈Z0,z 6=z∗
εJ0−Jzr
N∏
n=1
un (a
zr )
un,max
N |Z|∑
l=0
N |Z|∑
q=0
azrl,qε
lαεqc

≤
(b)
B (ε,N,M)
(1− εα) (1− εc)
 εc
M − 1
N∑
d=1
Md
∑
zr∈Zd
max
l,q
azrl,q +
∑
zr∈Z0,z 6=z∗
max
l,q
azrl,q
N∏
n=1
un (a
zr)
un,max
εJ0−Jzr
 ≤
B (ε,N,M)
(1− εα) (1− εc)
(
|Z|max
zr,l,q
azrl,q
)(
M
(
MN − 1)
(M − 1)2 ε
c + εJ0−J2
)
(63)
where (a) follows since B (ε,N,M) and ε
c
M−1 or ε
J0−Jzr ∏N
n=1
un(a
zr )
un,max
are factors of
∏
(z′→z)∈g Pz′z , and so are ε
ldεqc if g
is counted by azl,q. The factor M
d compensates for counting, in (61), the (non-existing) outgoing edge of zr ∈ Zd. Inequality
(b) follows from the two geometric series that appear by bounding as follows
N |Z|∑
l=0
N |Z|∑
q=0
azrl,qε
ldεqc ≤ max
l,q
azrl,q
∞∑
l=0
∞∑
q=0
εldεqc =
1
1− εd
1
1− εcmaxl,q a
zr
l,q. (64)
C. Lower Bounding piz∗
Using (63) we obtain
∑
zr∈Z,z 6=z∗
∑
g∈G(zr)
∏
(z′→z)∈g Pz′z∑
g∈G(z∗)
∏
(z′→z)∈g Pz′z
≤
(a)
B(ε,N,M)
(1−εα)(1−εc)
(
|Z|max
zr,l,q
azrl,q
)(
M(MN−1)
(M−1)2 ε
c + εJ0−J2
)
G∗
(∏N
n=1
un(a∗)
un,max
)
εJ0−J1A (ε,N,M)
=
∏N
n=1
un,max
un(a∗)
(1− εα) (1− εc)
(
|Z|
G∗maxzr,l,q
azrl,q
)(
M(MN−1)
(M−1)2 ε
c−J0+J1 + εJ1−J2
)
(1− εc)(N−1)(|Z0|−1)∏Nd′=1 (1− εc)(N−d′)|Zd′ | ≤(b)∏N
n=1
un,max
un(a∗)
(1− εα) (1− εc)(N−1)2NMN
2NMN maxzr,l,qazrl,q
G∗
(3MN−1εc−J0+J1 + εJ1−J2) (65)
where in (a) we used (63) for the numerator and the G∗ maximal trees of z∗ (from Subsection IX-A4) for the denominator.
Inequality (b) follows since
∑N
d′=1 (N − d′) |Zd′ | ≤ (N − 1) (|Z| − |Z0|) and |Z| = 2NMN . We also used
M(MN−1)
(M−1)2 ≤
3MN−1, which holds for all M > 1.
We conclude that if c >
∑
n un,max − J1 then (65) vanishes to zero as ε → 0. Hence, z∗ is the most likely state in the
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stationary distribution of Z for small enough ε. Specifically, having
ε < min

 N∏
n=1
un (a
∗)
un,max
(2M)
−N 3G∗
8max
zr,l,q
azrl,q

1
J1−J2
,
 N∏
n=1
un (a
∗)
un,max
(2M)
−N
M−N+1
G∗
8max
zr,l,q
azrl,q

1
c−J0+J1
 (66)
together with
ε < min
 1101/α ,
(
1−
(
9
10
) 1
(N−1)2NMN
)1/c (67)
is enough to ensure that piz∗ >
1
2 . Note that (66) is typically much stricter than (67). Also,
∏N
n=1
un(a
∗)
un,max
is typically not
much below one. Evaluating the factor G
∗
max
zr,l,q
azr
l,q
involves counting the number of trees in each category and can be done by a
computer program.
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